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ARTICLES 
DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: 




Some observers viewed the Supreme Court's decisions in Board of Edu-
cation v. DowelP and Freeman v. Pitts2 as the end of the era of 
mandatory school desegregation. They perceived that "unitary" districts 
would be able to rapidly resume local control, dismantle desegregation 
plans, and return to neighborhood schools, thus' making the situation 
much like that which existed outside the South before the desegregation 
era.s Courts would recognize that once-discriminatory districts had recti-
fied their problems and the disruption of normal practices that began with 
Brown v. Board of Education4 would come to an end in the 1990s. With 
the courts out of the way, racial issues would be set aside and the focus 
could be on improving education for everyone without the controversy or 
costs of desegregation plans. Believing that the door to dismantling is now 
open, many school boards are considering filing unitary stafus motions. 
The belief that there is a clear and certain path back to neighborhood 
schools, .however, goes far beyond the courts' actual decisions. The exper-
iences of districts that have decided to dismantle their desegregation plans 
illustrate a variety of troublesome problems that suggest the need for fur-
* Professor of Education and Social Policy, Harvard University Graduate School of Education 
and the Kennedy School of Government. 
** Harvard Law School, class of 1994. 
1 498 U.S. 237 (1991). 
• 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992). 
• See, e.g., Nat Hentoff, Back to Separate but Equal, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1992, at A25; Ruth 
Marcus, Court Cuts Federal Desegregation Role: Schcols' Anti-Bias Obligations Eased, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 1, 1992, at A1 (predicting Pitts would "prompt many of the several hundred school 
districts now operating under federal court orders to seek removal from court control"). 
• 347 U.S. 483 (1954). . 
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ther reflection. Political momentum has persuaded many districts to adopt 
dismantling policies without critically examining the evidence supporting 
their assumptions. This Article will assess the possible limitations of the 
assumptions, exploring available data and experience .. The evidence shows 
that a number of widely prevalent assumptions may be incorrect. 
The fundamental reason for the difficult and uncertain results of the 
dismantling efforts is that the legal standards for a court finding that a 
school district has purged its constitutional violation and become unitary 
have very little to do with whether the district has actually provided equal 
education to minority youths for a long enough time to overcome the cu-
mulative impact of generations of unequal opportunity. In fact, the stan-
dards require no showing that gaps in educational opportunity have actu-
ally narrowed. . 
In a society in which inequality is growing outside the schools, educa-
tional attainment has become even more critical for economic success in 
the United States. High school graduates now earn twice as much as 
dropouts,. and college graduates earn over 50% more than high school 
graduates. As education becomes even more decisive in students' lives, 
schools segregated by race and income continue to offer very different edu-
cational opportunities. This means that continued conflicts over issues of 
race and education are virtually. inevitable. Since local political leaders 
seldom face these issues forthrightly, strategies to return to the courts to 
obtain equal opportunities are very likely. To the extent that the courts 
conceive of racial inequality as a problem to be solved by a few years of 
student reassignment, they are simply incorrect. 
This Article examines not only the current state of desegregation law, 
but also the assumptions underlying local dismantling initiatives. It argues 
that the law is far less clear than many believe and that significant legal 
roadblocks to neighborhood schools remain. The United States Supreme 
Court, instead of establishing clear standards, has granted vast discretion 
to federal district courts to determine the good faith of school systems, the 
adequacy of their compliance with desegregation orders, and any ongoing 
responsibilities the district may have for educational inequities or for 
school actions that have caused housing segregation. Winning the right to 
re-establish neighborhood schools may be a difficult and risky enterprise; 
even a victory does not give a district any long-term assurance of freedom 
from judicial control on many other issues of equity for minority students. 
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School boards and superintendents decide to pursue termination of judi-
cial supervision on the basis of certain expectations about political and 
educational benefits for their systems. The final part of this Article ex-
plores a number of these expectations, assuming that administrators sin-
cerely believe that there will be educational benefits for students as well. 
The Article suggests that these expectations are unsupported. The ideas, 
for example, that political conflict will diminish and that non-judicial 
mechanisms can assure equity in the resegregated minority schools are not 
supported empirically in several districts. Local comniitments to special 
programs for resegregated schools last only a limited time. Furthermore, 
the assumption that we now know how to provide equal education in seg-
regated schools has not proved true in spite of considerable efforts. Costs 
are not likely to decline. In some districts, racial tensions and legal dis-
agreements across racial lines have continued at a high level. The hoped-
for end of white flight and the return of white students have not material-
ized at all in some systems and have been far below predictions in others. 
This Article suggests that school districts should consider a fundamen-
tally different approach to ending their mandatory school desegregation 
plans. Experience in several districts suggests that there may be opportu-
nities to gradually increase the number of naturally integrated neighbor-
hood schools and remove them from the busing plan as the reality of inte-
gration becomes more widely accepted in a community. At the same time, 
a phased transition from a mandatory plan to one heavily based on choice 
and educational opportunities for all students may be easier because there 
are no stereotyped minority schools in fully integrated systems where all 
schools are similarly integrated and where families are accustomed to 
dealing with transportation and interracial education. The way to end the 
onerous parts of a desegregation plan may be to move powerfully toward 
the next stage of integration, in which much less coercion may be needed, 
if managed skillfully, and in which much less long-term conflict will oc-
cur. Investment in policies within schools that can maximize the educa-
tional benefits of desegregation can increase gains from desegregation. 
A. Doctrines and Realities 
This Article does not primarily analyze the logical structure and doctri-
nal elements of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the dismantling 
cases. It is an exploration of the relationship between elements of the deci-
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sions, the public and political reaction to the issues raised by the decisions, 
and the actual experience of communities attempting to end court supervi-
sion and dismantle all or part of their desegregation plan. Local leaders 
cannot assess the impact of the court decisions or the costs and benefits of 
a litigation strategy aimed at dismantling without considering these 
relationships. 
B. The Shifting Legal Framework 
The determination that a school system is no longer a racially defined 
dual system but rather a single unitary system assumed new importance 
after unitary status became the foundation for the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruling that Norfolk, Virginia could dismantle part of its desegre-
gation plan. II Despite its central role in the termination of judicial supervi-
sion and the dismantling of desegregation plans, the concept of unitary 
status remains unclear and the various prescriptions for how to attain it 
are rife with ambiguous terms.6 In Pitts and Dowell, the Supreme Court 
expressly refused to define "unitary"7 and noted that "the term 'unitary' 
does not have fixed meaning."8 The Court's admonition that "unitary" is 
not a term found in the Constitution9 has not dissuaded the lower courts 
from simply incorporating the Court's new standards into their continuep 
use of the label.lo Rather than reconciling or clarifying differences in in-
terpretation, Pitts and Dowell may actually increase the confusion in this 
area of law. Although unitary status has not been clearly defined, practice 
has established some guidelines for determining if it has been achieved. 
The Court first used the term "unitary" in Green v. New Kent County 
• Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986). 
• See generally Martha McCarthy, Elusive Unitary Status, 69 W. EDUC. L. REP. 9 (1991); 
Jonathan A. David, Note, Replacing Confusion with Compromise: The Supreme Court's New Stan-
dard for Dissolving Desegregation Decrees in Board of Education v. Dowell, 2 SETON HALL CONST. 
L.J. 337 (1991). 
7 The Dowell Court made the unhelpful observation that the term .. 'unitary' describe(sl a school 
system that has been brought into compliance with the eommand of the Constitution," thus avoiding 
any substantive discussion of what compliance might require. Board of tduc. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 
237, 245 (1991). 
• Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1444 (1992). 
• Dowell, 498 U.S. at 245. 
10 See Lee v. Etowah County Bd. of Educ., 963 F.2d 1416 (11th Cir. 1992), and Lee v. Tal-
ladega County Bd. of Educ., 963 F.2d 1426 (11th Cir, 1992), for examples of post-Pitts cases incor-
porating the Court's new standards into determinations of unitariness. 
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School Board.ll There the Court identified six indicia of a dual system: 
racial identification of students, faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricu-
lar activities, and facilities.12 These so-called "Green factors" have become 
the most commonly utilized gui<;les in determining whether a school dis-
trict is unitary. The Court in Green further established the goal of eradi-
cating racially identifiable schools to create a "system without a 'white' 
school and a 'Negro' school, but just schools."l3 The Court subsequently 
described a unitary system as one "within which no person is to be effec-
tively excluded from any school because of race or color."l' Under Green, 
judges had normal discretion concerning factual determinations, but upon 
finding a constitutional violation their choices were limited to options that 
"promise[] realistically to work now."l!> Green saw the remedy as a means 
to achieve a nonracial system, not a temporary punishment which could 
soon be replaced once again by segregated schools. 
Shifting the focus away from unitary status, the Supreme Court in 
Dowell and Pitts attempted to articulate a new standard for dissolving 
court decrees and allowing partial dismantling of desegregation plans. 
Court control should be relinquished if, looking to all facets of school op-
erations with the Gre~n factors as a guide, the court determines that 
school districts have complied with desegregation plans in good faith for a 
reasonable period of time and have eliminated vestiges of de jure discrimi-
nation to the extent practicable.l6 The Pitts Court endorsed the inclusion 
of quality of education in the list of factors to consider and allowed the 
incremental dissolution of judicial control.17 
Far from clarifying the old confusion over unitariness, these cases offer 
vague terms and expand the discretion of district court judges. In a way, 
this marks a return to the situation that existed right before the Supreme 
11 391 u.s. 430 (1967). 
12 [d. at 435. 
18 Id. at 442. One commentator has identified the existence of racially identifiable schools, along 
with the effects of school placement and the effects of school segregation on housing patterns, as three 
types of lingering effects that are particularly relevant to the Court's rulings. Brian K. Landsberg, 
The Desegregated School System and the Retrogression Plan, 48 LA. L. REv. 789, 819 (1988). 
U Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19,20 (1969). 
10 Green, 391 U.S. at 439 (emphasis in original). 
18 Dowell, 498 U.S. at 250. 
17 Pitts, 112 S. Ct. at 1445-46. 
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Court in Green, Swann,18 and Alexander gave lower courts clear march-
ing orders. 
c. Ambiguous Standards and Judicial Discretion 
According to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the "factual findings 
of the district court in school desegregation cases are entitled to great def-
erence on review when the presiding judicial officer has lived with the 
case for many years."19 This discretion is particularly broad given the 
Court's failure to clarify the terms used to describe the legal standards 
such as "good faith" and "vestiges of discrimination."20 
The incorporation of the term "practicable" into standards for dissolv-
ing decrees creates a major ambiguity as used in Dowell and Pitts/I.! Since 
few cases have applied this standard in the school desegregation context, 
the latitude courts will allow in determining practicability is unclear. 
Given the deferential review standards, however, determinations of practi-
cability will be highly discretionary and district court decisions will be 
difficult to overturn. This discretion will bring widely varying sets of con-
stitutional standards to different districts. On remand in Dowell, 
Oklahoma City was found to have eliminated all vestiges of discrimination 
to the extent practicable.22 No such determination has been made yet in 
Pitts, concerning DeKalb County. 
The inclusion of quality of education provides another broad playing 
field for the exercise of judicial discretion. Issues of educational quality 
have been considered before by lower courts,28 but courts have little guid-
18 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
18 School Bd. v. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308, 1313 (4th Cir. 1987). 
2. Justice Marshall noted that "vestiges of discrimination" have never been defined by the Court. 
Dowell, 498 U.S. at 260-61 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
21 The Pitts Court stated that DeKaib County's "desegregation decree was designed to achieve 
maximum practicable desegregation," attributing the new "practicable" standard to the much earlier· 
district court decision. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. at 1447. For earlier descriptions of the purposes of decrees, 
compare Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38 (holding that school districts are "clearly charged with the affirm-
ative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial 
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch") with Brown v. Board of Educ., 892 F.2d 851, 
859 (10th Cir. 1989) (stating that a school district must "eliminate[) all traces of past intentional 
segregation to the maximum feasible extent"). 
~. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 778 F. Supp. 1144 (W.D. Okla. 1991). 
os See, e.g., Baliles, 829 F.2d at 1312 (holding that "comparative dropout rates, graduation rates, 
and scores on standardized tests" could be considered in making the determination of whether a sys-
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ance in making determinations of quality. Because of the range of debate 
among educators as to what constitutes quality education and how quality 
can be measured, the inclusion of this element becomes a tool of broad 
discretion for district courts. 
The legal standards applied by district courts became even murkier 
with the Supreme Court's decision in Pitts, holding that courts may relin-
quish their jurisdiction over aspects of a school district's operations in in-
crements. Under Pitts, full compliance with one aspect of a decree may 
lead to dismissal of judicial supervision of that aspect. No court has tried 
to reconcile this piecemeal approach with Dowell's mandate to consider all 
facets of operation in determining good faith compliance with desegrega-
tion plans. Necessary judicial conclusions about the independence or inter-
relatedness of aspects of a school's operation provide further opportut:\ity 
for the exercise of broad discretion. 
It remains to be seen how much of a shift Dowell and Pitts will create 
on a case-by-case basis after filtering through the lower courts. By al-
lowing the courts to relinquish their jurisdiction incrementally despite re-
maining vestiges of de jure segregation, the Court has taken a step back-
wards from its earlier mandate that segregation be removed root and 
branch.2' In DeKalb County, the various components of a desegregated 
school system established by Green were never present simultaneously in 
the district for even a single school year. With the Court's focus on past 
constitutional violations rather than current educational equities, it has 
shifted the nature of desegregation decrees from ongoing assurances of 
equality to short-term punishments to leave behind as soon as possible. 
Where Green recognized the need to uproot the many interrelated facets 
of a school system divided by race, Dowell and Pitts conceptualize the 
remedial process as a checklist of minimal time periods of formal compli-
ance. These decisions, however, allow any judge to maintain an entire 
plan upon a finding that the separate portions have a necessary interrela-
tionship and that the school district has not fulfilled requirements, thus 
failing to demonstrate good faith. 
tern is unitary). 
Sf Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38. 
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D. Legal Uncertainties and District Choices 
Unitary status judgments have been central in decisions to relinquish 
judicial control and allow the dismantling of desegregation. In addition to 
the diversity of practice in assigning the unitary label, the various ap-
proaches taken by different courts have contrasted sharply in their inter-
pretations of the subsequent impact of unitary status. Some courts have 
maintained that a finding of unitary status is synonymous with a finding 
that a district has completely eliminated all vestiges of de jure desegrega-
tion and is thus starting with a clean slate.25 Other courts have used the 
term only to mean that a district has operated in compliance with consti-
tutional mandates for a certain period of time, often three years.26 Recent 
cases have adopted the former usage,27 but even a consensus in labeling 
would not clarify the ambiguity of pre-existing findings of unitariness. At 
a recent conference on school desegregation featuring advocates of disman-
tling,28 the vast majority of school district representatives did not know 
whether their districts were unitary. Among those who knew that their 
districts had been declared unitary, most did not know what interpretation 
of unitariness guided those declarations. 
Although local control achieved through unitary status is considered im-
portant as a prerequisite to dismantling a desegregation plan, it has be-
come a paramount goal in its own right because it is believed that local 
control frees school districts from litigation and allows them to return to 
neighborhood schools.29 As the Pitts majority writes, "the court's end pur-
pose must be to remedy the violation and in addition to restore state and 
local authorities to the control of a school system. . . ."30 Administrators 
•• See, e.g., Price v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 945 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1991); Riddick v. School 
Bd., 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986). 
28 See Landsberg, supra note 13, at 812 ("[U)nitariness adds to the connotation of a formerly 
dual system which has sucessfully and in good faith implemented a constitutionally sufficient desegre-
gation plan .... Unitariness says nothing, however, about [the connotation) that all effects of past 
discrimination have permanendy been extirpated.") . 
• 7 See, e.g., Lee v. Etowah County Bd. of EdUc., 963 F.2d 1416, 1419 n.3 (11th Cir. 1992). 
•• Desegregation Conference Sponsored by George Mason University's Institute for Public Pol-
icy, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 23, 1992). 
•• Emphasizing local control, former Solicitor General Kenneth Starr characterized both Dowell 
and Pitts as cases "about democratic theory." Kenneth Starr, Keynote Address at Desegregation Con-
ference Sponsored by George Mason University's Institute for Public Policy, Washington, D.C. {Oct. 
23, 1992}. 
so Pitts, 112 S. Ct. at 1445 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the Court's emphasis on local 
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see unitary status as the key to achieving local control, prompting a closer 
look at the possibilities and potential pitfalls. 
Achieving unitary status is important in determining the burdens of 
proof that parties wIll bear in future litigation. In general, a district which 
is not unitary bears the burden of proving that any current segregation is 
not the result of prior constitutional violations. A nonunitary system must 
not take "any action that would impede the process of converting to a 
unitary system. . . . The board is under a heavy burden of showing that 
any action it takes that continues the effects of the illegal dual system 
serves a legitimate end."31 Districts under court supervision cannot take 
action that has the foreseeable effect of harming minority students without 
a significant risk of court intervention. Following a finding of unitariness, 
however, the burden shifts to the plaintiffs to show new discriminatory 
intent motivating the action.32 Since few contemporary school authorities 
admit that they have intentionally discriminated, the burden of proof is 
difficult to meet. 
In practicel unitary sta,tus and the accompanying shift in the burden of 
proof may be the difference which allows a, system to dismantle a desegre-
gation plan. For example, in Texas, the Austin Independent School Dis-
trict ("AISD") was declared unitary in 1983 and the court relinquished 
all control in 1986. In 1987, the school board was forced to defend its 
decision to redraw attendance zones in an attempt to create neighborhood 
schools. Under the district's 1987 plan, "nearly one-third of AISD's ele-
mentary schools had a minority eprollment of greater than eighty per-
cent."33 The trial court allowed these racially identifiable schools as prod-
control as an ultimate end, see Lisa Stewart, Another Slcirmish in the Equal Education Bat-
tle-Freeman v. Pitts, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 217 (1993). 
31 Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 535 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986). The 
court further stated that "[rJecission of a voluntary desegregation plan itself may be found to be an act 
of segregation for a school board which has been found to have practiced de jure segregation and has 
not completed the transition from a dual to a unitary school system." !d.; see also NAACP v. Lansing 
Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042 (6th Cir.), cerl. denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977). 
32 In circuits where unitary was defined as current compliance, a finding of unitary status does 
not necessarily correspond to the ending of judicial supervision. Where unitary status has been used 
synonymously with recognition that all vestiges of discrimination are eliminated, a unitary declaration 
forecloses future challenges based on past discrimination. Price v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 945 F.2d 
1307, 1314 (5th Cir. 1991). 
as Theodore Karatinos, Price v. Austin Independent School District: Desegregation's Unitary 
Tar Baby, 77 W. EDUC. L. REP. 15 (1992); see also Price v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 729 F. Supp. 
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ucts of the demographic trend even though student reassignments under 
the plan created racial imbalance in fourteen of the nineteen imbalanced 
schools.34 In contrast, a plan in pre-unitary Dallas was rejected because it 
caused too many one-race schools.311 
While unitary status may make it easier in some instances to dismantle 
desegregation plans, dismantling should not be confused with a guaran-
teed end to all litigation. Although unitary status makes it more difficult 
for plaintiffs to prevail on a desegregation issue, the same group of stu-
dents can raise many other kinds of legal issues. As long as inequalities 
continue and elected officials are unresponsive, creative plaintiffs will pur-
sue other avenues even if the path to desegregation seems closed. The ex-
perience of Austin is again illustrative: it demonstrates the potential for 
ongoing, protracted litigation following a declaration of unitary status and 
an initial ruling in favor of the school district on the dismantling front. 
Plaintiffs have challenged AISD's treatment of bilingual teachers, alloca-
tions of resources, bond issues, and access to budget il1formation. In short, 
there is no indication that the declaration of unitary status has in any way 
diminished the school district's litIgation. In some cases attempts to attain 
unitary status possibly will wake up sleeping plaintiffs and bring renewed 
suspicion and conflicts to school districts where race issues had been rela-
tively dormant.38 
Any plaintiff can bring a new discrimination case on any purported 
violation at any time, opening 'up a wide range of seemingly settfed issues. 
Less than a decade after Los Angeles dismantled a large state court busing 
order in 1980, the district faced both a federal desegregation case (settled 
out of court) and a state court case on unequal education, raising many of 
the same issues that had motivated the initial legal battle. Although the 
Los Angeles case was not a federal unitary status case, there was the same 
assumption that the district's 1981 victory had ended a long legal struggle. 
The battle simply moved to new arenas. Civil rights lawyers elsewhere 
also are seeking new ways to pursue desegregation; some now are explor-
533, 539 (W.D. Tex. 1990). 
U Karatinos, supra note 33, at 20. 
M Tasby v. Wright, 713 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1983). 
as Telephone Interview with Nonna Cantu, Counsel for the Mexican-American Legal Defense 
and Education Fund (Feb. 10, 1993). Cantu is now Assistant United States Secretary of Education 
for Civil Rights. 
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ing the possibility of desegregation orders pursuant to state constitutional 
rights, particularly in the metropolitan Hartford case.37 
Systems contemplating filing for unitary status should consider that de-
cisions allowing dismantling usually will not be acquired without a fight. 
The DeKalb County School System's decision to seek a declaration of uni-
tary status resulted in years of litigation and costs which surpassed a mil-
lion dollars before arguments on remand from the Supreme Court.38 Now, 
after a "victory" at the Supreme Court, the case is back in the district 
court for hearings on many of the same issues that were litigated in the 
initial attempt to gain unitary status.39 Some of the data in the case are 
now over a decade old and the entire county has changed drastically while 
the case has been pending. Given the potentially enormous costs of litiga-
tion and the fact that nonunitary districts carry the burden of proving that 
they deserve unitary status, many districts are leery about entering the 
fray. Some districts believe that they could ultimately win release from 
court control, but decide it is not worth the effort and expense."o 
School districts should further consider the potential loss of court-
ordered funding, often called Milliken II funding,41 in d~ciding to file for 
declarations of unitary status. The St. Louis and Kansas City cases, for 
example, each resulted in Milliken II funds of over one billion dollars. 
Since Milliken II assistance is intended to remedy the persisting harms of 
segregation, a district's success in obtaining a ruling that it has success-
fully become a unitary, non-racial system may work directly against its 
interest in obtaining this state aid. The Richmond School Board encoun-
tered this problem when it sued the state for additional funding to address 
the special needs found in urban area schools. The Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals ruled that since "we have found no vestiges of state-mandated 
segregation ... following a finding of unitary status, we affirm the court's 
81 See Sheff v. O'Neill, 609 A.2d 1072 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1992). 
sa Gary Samms, Counsel for the DeKalb County School System, Remarks at Desegregation 
Conference Sponsored by George Mason University's Institute for Public Policy, Washington, D.C. 
(Oct. 23, 1992). 
sa See Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992) . 
.. Such considerations may have influenced the El Paso, Texas, Independent School District's 
decision not to file for unitary status in 1987. Similar concerns may be preventing the State of Texas 
from appealing a statewide desegregation order currently in effect. Telephone Interview with Norma 
Cantu, Counsel for the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund (Feb. 10, 1993) . 
.. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). 
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refusal to order state funding of remedial and compensatory programs."4Z 
The DeKalb County School System is now in court trying to obtain Milli-
ken II funding, despite their concurrent efforts to end judicial supervision. 
Many districts, including Yonkers, New York, are now exploring the pos-
sibility of major new sources of state assistance through Milliken II or-
ders. The district court ruled for Yonkers on August 30, 1993. 
The uncertain legal standards, the high cost of initial litigation, and the 
reality of continuing challenges in the courts should be carefully weighed 
before districts proceed with efforts to dismantle. If the underlying ine-
qualities have not been resolved, there is no way to assure an end to court 
intervention, and the vagueness of the legal standards preclude confident 
predictions of litigation in any case. 
II. EXPECTATIONS AND REALITIES 
Local school officials enter a dismantling battle and agree to bear the 
costs because they expect real net advantages. This part of the Article 
examines how things actually have worked out in some cases, but it is not 
intended to be a comprehensive study. This part illustrates some of the 
unexpected results associated with dismantling decisions. It describes the 
battles that came with dismantling efforts in some districts, battles that 
often continued after such decisions. 
A. Do Resegregated Schools Reverse White Flight? 
Districts often attempt to end busing primarily because they believe 
that the continual rise in the proportion of minority students is caused by 
white flight from desegregated schools. In other words, local leaders and 
courts often believe that desegregation plans are not stable and that the 
dismantling of desegregation plans can produce an end to white flight or 
even a return of the white population. This argument has proven to be 
persuasive to some courts, although others have rejected similar evidence 
on an issue that deeply divides scholars. In many dismantling cases the 
school districts hire experts versed in this theory to conduct studies or 
testify about white flight. 
Often the decisions to dismantle desegregation plans are related to as-
•• School Bd. v. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308, 1314 (4th Cir. 1987). 
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sertions that the decline in white enrollment in a school district is caused 
by a busing plan. School districts argue that they have done everything 
practicable but the remedies have failed because of white flight and hous-
ing changes. Thus, ending busing will lead to a return of white students. 
White flight research, after all, shows that when there is significant flight, 
most of the families affected do not leave the area, but only transfer their 
children to private schools. 
Local school officials and courts often attribute the total decline in the 
proportion of white students to the desegregation plan. Federal courts also 
make this error. For example, the first major dismantling of a federal 
court desegregation order, in Norfolk, Virginia,43 followed a district court 
decision in which the judge attributed the entire change in the district's 
enrollment to the school desegregation plan. The court gave no considera-
tion to changing birth rates, the pattern of white suburbanization that 
existed long before the busing plan, or the large declines in white enroll-
ment that took place in other similar central cities with neighborhood 
schools.44 The court reached an extreme conclusion which none of the 
experts on either side would have supported. The press and local school 
officials frequently express exactly the same conclusion. 
Neighborhood school plans, however, are not stable. The DeKalb 
County School System, the subject of the Pitts decision, was one of the 
nation's least stable districts, even though it was operating under a neigh-
borhood school plan and never employed any significant busing for deseg-
regation. The school district changed from 95% white in 1967 to 49% 
white in 1986. Among the nation's sixty largest school districts, it ranked 
fourth in decline in proportion of white students and second in increase in 
proportion of black students.41i This decline in the percentage of white 
population was not caused by the neighborhood school system. It is un-
likely that court decisions limiting desegregation will fundamentally alter 
this pattern which has been continuing throughout the progress of the 
case. If the DeKalb County School System eventually prevails, it will end 
up with a plan designed to preserve white enrollment in a district where 
4S See Riddick v. School Bd., 627 F. Supp. 814 (1984), affd, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), ceri. 
denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986). 
•• Gary Orfield & Franklin Monfort, Racial Change and Desegregation in Large School Dis-
tricts (1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the National School Boards Association) . 
•• !d. at 10-11. 
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the great majority of whites have already left in spite of a neighborhood 
school policy that always protected whites from busing. 
The demographic shift is rooted in a large housing change and a pat-
tern of massive black migration into DeKalb County. This pattern, which 
was used as a defense against a desegregation order is, in fact, very strong 
evidence that attributing racial change in a school district to white flight 
from a desegregation plan is a radical oversimplification. The need for a 
much closer look by courts and researchers at the white flight issue is 
apparent, as is the need to examine the causes of the spreading segrega-
tion in the housing market. 
The white flight issue is usually raised, of course, in communities with 
a history of mandatory desegregation on which the instability is blamed. 
Th~ Norfolk decision,46 the first major dismantling case in the federal 
courts, was deeply influenced by expert witness testimony about white 
flight. Subsequently, however, studies by other researchers revealed seri-
ous errors in the expert witnesses' projections on which the court relied. 
Researchers systematically examined what actually happened in the 
school district-both before the dismantling, when the court said that 
large-scale white flight was occurring, and after dismantling, when whites 
were expected to return. Stating that "[t]his Court gives credence to these 
predictions"4'1 of white flight if busing continued, the court's decision ex-
pressed the hope that "the present ratio of black students and white stu-
dents ... might be narrowed with the school board's neighborhood ele-
mentary schools in place."48 
Norfolk's efforts to return to neighborhood schools were supported by 
the Reagan Administration and the Justice Department. In a 1984 speech 
to the National Association of Neighborhood Schools, for example, Assis-
tant Attorney General W. Bradford Reynolds told an anti-busing group 
that "the experi~ent with forced busing as the principal ... remedial tool 
to desegregate a public school district is largely over."49 Reynolds blamed 
the flight from urban public schools on desegregation orders and told of 
the Justice Department's battles to convince judges that "[i]t is high-time 
•• Riddick v. School Bd., 627 F. Supp. 814 (1984), aifd, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 938 (1986) . 
.. Riddick, 627 F. Supp. at 822 . 
• 8 ld. at 821. 
•• United States Department of Justice Press Release (Aug. 10, 1984). 
HeinOnline -- 42 Emory L. J. 773 1993
1993] DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION 773 
that our Federal courts released their hold on school districts that have 
been in compliance for some time with comprehensive desegregation 
decrees. "ISO 
The Court's reliance on expert predictions makes close scrutiny con-
cerning the accuracy of these predictions even more important. David Ar-
mor, one of the most active witnesses in dismantling cases and efforts to 
block urban desegregation orders, testified in the Norfolk case. He has 
said that its holdings were crucial to similar dismantlings in other cities. 51 
Armor testified in 1981 that the school district had lost about 8,000 white 
students due to its busing plan and that it would lose another 8,000 to 
10,000 white students between 1981 and 1987, making the district 75% 
black.1S2 Armor predicted that the school district would gain significant 
numbers of white students if neighborhood schools were reinstated and the 
district court agreed. 
Researchers at Norfolk's Old Dominion University reported that the 
end of busing produced increased segregation in thirteen white schools and 
ten black schools, most of which were near housing projects. Yet, even 
before dismantling began, the researchers found that Armor's projections 
were incorrect. In the four years following the 1981 prediction-while 
mandatory busing was still in place-the number of white students de-
clined by less than one-fourth the predicted level. Also, beginning in 1983, 
the system began to experience a modest increase in the number of white 
students even though busing continued. In 1984, evidence that white en-
rollment in grades planned for resegregation was actually rising was 
presented to the district court to challenge the basic premise of disman-
tling. The court, however, did not acknowledge this data. Researchers 
Leslie Carr and Donald Zeigler conclude that "when busing ended in 
1986, it was ended in an elementary school system that was stable and 
showing a modest gain in the enrollment of white students. The system 
was not plunging toward resegregation as the result of white fiight."ISS 
6°ld. 
61 David J. Armor, Response to Carr and Zeigler's "White Flight and White Return in'Nor-
folk," 64 Soc. OF EDUC. 134-39 (1991). 
6. The court gave credence to the possibility that the black student population could rise to as 
high as 90%. Riddick, 627 F. Supp. at 822. 
68 Leslie G. Carr & Donald J. Zeigler, White Flight and White Return in Norfolk: A Test of 
Predictions, 63 Soc. OF EDUC. 272, 277 (1990). 
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Armor responded that the gain in white enrollment during these years 
resulted from the hope that neighborhood schools would be restored:!' 
Theories of "anticipatory flight" and "anticipatory return" are frequently 
introduced into these cases but are without substantial basis in research. 
Armor had predicted that the end of busing would produce a 7% an-
nual increase of white enrollment. In fact, the growth during the first four 
years averaged about 3%, peaking in the second year before dropping. 
The growth was less than 2% higher than the trend established the three 
years before resegregation.l!1i In the fourth and fifth years, 1989 and 1990, 
the white gains-.3% and .2% respectively-fell well below the level ex-
isting in the years before the neighborhood school plan was imple-
mented.IiB Thus, the white flight record was not consistent with the claims 
adopted by the court. The return to segregation brought about only a 
small and temporary change in the previous trend. 
Other districts which dismantled desegregation orders or decided not to 
pursue them because of the white flight issue often failed to achieve stabil-
ity. After Los Angeles dismantled its mandatory plan in 1981, it contin-
ued to experience a significant drop in the proportion of white students, 
even in the first year. Atlanta leaders negotiated a compromise to drop 
busing litigation in 1973, but then a large number of whites left, followed 
by a significant number of middle-class black students.1i7 Among the na-
tion's large central cities, Atlanta experienced the largest growth in its 
proportion of black enrollment from 1967 to 1986, when it was 92% 
black, in spite of its anti-busing compromise. liB 
These statistics do not show that there is no white flight. They do show, 
however, that it is an error to blame white enrollment declines totally or 
,even largely on desegregation plans. Further, it is erroneous to expect that 
ending the plans and operating neighborhood schools will produce stabil-
ity or large white enrollment returns. 
G4 Armor, supra note 51, at 137-38 . 
•• Carr & Zeigler, supra note 53, at 277-79. 
oe Leslie G. Carr, Reply to Armor, 64 SOC. OF EDUC. 223, 226 (1991) . 
•• GARY ORFIELD & CAROLE AsHKINAZE, THE CLOSING DOOR: CONSERVATIVE POLICY AND 
BLACK OPPORTUNITY, ch. 5 (1991) . 
.. Orfield & Monfort, supra note 44, at 10. 
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B. Achieving Stability and Desegregation 
While some districts dismantling their plans experienced continuing 
loss of white stud~nts, others voluntarily maintained large-scale busing or 
devised new complex forms of integration and educational improvement in 
the 1980s while maintaining a stable proportion of white students. Cur-
rent data shows, in other words, that certain forms of desegregation plans 
were associated with less white flight in the 1980s than many neighbor-
hood school plans. 
. Districts now filing for unitary status are seeking to obtain freedom 
from court orders and thus return to a neighborhood school system where 
desegregation is no longer a concern and attention can return to normal 
educational issues. In general, however, uni~ary status does not end this 
serious battle over racial inequality in the courts because resegregation 
creates visible inequalities. As a result, a number of the largest districts 
without court-mandated desegregation plans have voluntarily chosen to 
maintain desegregation policies long after court supervision ended. These 
communities have experienced much less controversy except when major 
changes in their plans were under discussion. Some have been able to 
move from mandatory to voluntary approaches without returning their 
schools to segregation. 
In Louisville, Kentucky, the Jefferson County School District was re-
leased from court jurisdiction in 1980 while maintaining metropolitan-
wide desegregation. The district enjoyed far more stability than most large 
systems with neighborhood schools. The overall percentage of black stu-
dents in Louisville rose only 1.8% in a decade while, even more surpris-
ingly, the percentage in early grades showed almost no change (see Table 
1). This indicates long-term stability for the system. Even in the district 
which experienced considerable white flight when the bitterly fought 1975 
metropolitan plan began, extraordinary stability was achieved a few years 
later. 
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TABLE 1 
Enrollment, Metropolitan Louisville, Kentucky 
Fall 1981-Fall 1991 
Overall Grades 1-5 
Year Total Students Black Students % Black % Black 
1981 93,955 26,580 28.3 29.6 
1983 90,962 26,689 29.3 30.3 
1985 90,579 27,448 30.3 31.3 
1987 89,284 27,184 30.4 31.2 
1989 87,768 26,581 30.3 30.7 
1991 90,070 27,141 30.1 29.8 
Source: Jefferson' County Enrollment Statistics 
During the 1980s, two other models showed considerable potential for 
maintaining stability. The St. Louis model, with large scale city-suburban 
transfers and city magnet schools, left the city district with a stable pro-
portion of white students after many decades of decline. After experienc-
ing a rapid decline in the proportion of white students for decades, St. 
Louis experienced a slight increase in its proportion of white students in 
the city system between 1980 and 1992. In Kansas City, a massive up-
grading of the city school facilities and huge investments in magnet schools 
produced a similar result, although there was little integration. 
Because it was the site of the first major busing order in the nation, 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina might be expected to be a leader 
in resegregation and neighborhood schools. However, the district contin-
ued to implement' its desegregation plan even after Judge McMillan 
dropped court supervision. The large metropolitan system has now par-
tially replaced mandatory assignments with magnet schools which have 
met their desegregation goals in the first year. Like Louisville, the contin-
uing voluntary affirmation of integration has avoided a return to court and 
avoided the return of ghetto schools. 
C. Costs and Voluntary Plans 
School districts should not enter into unitary status proceedings with 
the expectation of large cost savings. This is particularly true if the dis-
trict is committed to voluntary approaches or major upgrading of inner-
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city schools as an . alternative to the mandatory plan the district wishes to 
dissolve. Very few districts wish to simply embrace segregated education; 
most want to maintain the opportunity for desegregation for those most 
strongly wishing to transfer. Districts wishing to maintain some form of 
desegregation plan need to realize that they have more legal authority to 
take positive steps to support integration when they are under a court 
order, and they are less likely to receive external funding if they are found 
unitary. 
A new national study of magnet schools shows that they cost more than 
non-magnets. Over two-thirds received "additional staffing allowances, 
which were most frequently used for additional teachers or instructional 
aides."159 Furthermore, starting new magnet schools often requires the 
purchase of new equipment, modification of school facilities, and retrain-
ing of teachers.80 To offer a genuine alternative, the magnet school needs 
to make the investment required to provide the program. In addition, 
transportation to magnet schools is far more expensive than mandatory 
transportation. Mandatory transportation picks up from a. concentrated 
area and drops students at a single school; voluntary transportation must 
go from dispersed pick-up places to dispersed destinations. This creates 
long and overlapping bus routes. If there is a major magnet plan, it is 
very possible that a school district's costs will be significantly raised. 
However, these additional expenditures for magnet schools did not 
lower the rate of long-term white flight, which was not significantly dif-
ferent from the rate in districts with mandatory busing.81 Therefore, the 
result may be a difficult combination of rising costs and persisting white 
decline. 
D. Protecting Little Children: Segregating Primary Grades 
In a number of the exist!ng dismantling plans, the goal has been to end 
all or some of the desegregation in the early grade levels but not desegre-
gation altogether. The basic idea is that desegregation is a difficult and 
traumatic process, particularly when it requires transporting students 
, 
Gt AMERICAN INSTITUTES FOR REsEARCH, MAGNET SCHOOLS AND IssUES OF DESEGREGA-
TION, QUALITY AND CHOICE at x (1993) . 
•• Id. at xi. 
II Id. at xvi. 
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away from their neighborhoods. Proponents reason that if it must be done, 
the youngest children should be spared the stress. In cities such as N or-
folk, Austin, and Oklahoma City, the school boards have followed this 
reasoning and ended desegregation of the earliest primary grades. Dallas 
and Los Angeles (when it had a mandatory plan) excluded students in 
kindergarten through grade three.62 
This practice has a variety of drawbacks that deserve careful considera-
tion in devising plans. The most fundamental is that desegregation is easi-
est, and, according to a significant body of research, most beneficial, at the 
earliest grades. Robert Crain and Rita' Mahard's review of ninety-three 
studies showed that desegregation beginning in first grade or kindergarten 
and continuing through later years produced much better results in terms 
of achievement gains than desegregation beginning at higher grade 
levels. 63 Young children have little concept of race, few, stereotypes, and 
begin with smaller educational gaps. Desegregation seems normal to small 
children and not a difficult change. Accordingly, handling a desegregated 
classroom at this age does not require many special skills. 
The real concern about desegregation at an early age is among adults 
who believe that it is a much more difficult process than it actually is. 
Their fear creates political problems and demands that operate indepen-
dently of, and even in dIrect contradiction to, the most beneficial situations 
for their children. Proposals to end desegregation in the earliest grades 
require the most careful examination not only by courts but also by school 
boards and administrators, since they are likely to increase the difficulty 
and conflict and diminish the benefits of the desegregation process. Later 
initiation of desegregation confronts teachers with much more complex 
and difficult problems of developed racial stereotypes, different school ex-
periences, and larger achievement gaps. 
Ten Louisville teachers wrote a letter to the local paper in 1991 on the 
costs of restoring segregated grade schools: 
Over the years we began to notice some remarkable changes. Our 
students-white, black, disadvantaged and middle-class-came to us 
with acceptance, or at least a tolerance, for one another that had not 
existed in busing's early years. Consequently, we can spend more of 
•• WILLIS D. HAWLEY ET AL., STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE DESEGREGATION 54 (1983) . 
•• [d. at 53. 
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our school time attending to the work of schools: teaching and learn-
ing. If students attend elementary schools that are not racially bal-
anced, we fear a return to the situations we encountered in the late 
'70s .... 64 
E. Equalizing Segregated Schools 
779 
A constant" refrain in the arguments for ending judicial supervision of 
school districts is the claim that dollars spent on getting students to deseg-
regated schools could be better spent within the minority schools and that 
sensitive educators could use that money to produce more educational 
gains within the segregated context. This argument has been made since 
busing plans began more than two decades ago. The Effective Schools 
model, for example, was widely presented by its originator, Ron Ed-
munds, as an effective alternative to desegregated education. As minority 
superintendents assumed control of many of the highly segregated large 
city school systems since the early 1970s, many variations of programs 
emphasizing high expectations and highly focused teaching claimed that 
they could bring segregated schools to the national norm or above. Intense 
national attention has focused on remarkable inner-city schools or teach-
ers. Movies telling the stories of Marva Collins' school on Chicago's West 
Side61S and Jaime Escalante's calculus Class in East Los Angeles66 show 
the readiness to celebrate evidence of equalizing segregated schools, even 
in a single school or classroom. 
Many billions of dollars of federal aid have been poured into this effort. 
The two biggest federal pre-collegiate education programs, Chapter I and 
Headstart, are both targeted on concentrations of low-income children and 
channel large sums of dollars into upgrading segregated schools. In con-
trast to the growth and duration of these efforts during the past three 
decades, the small program of federal aid to desegregated schools (the 
Emergency School Aid Act) was eliminated in 1981. Except in a handful 
of states, there has been no assistance, apart from court orders, to make 
desegregation work. 
64 Claudia Runge et aI., Teachers Fear "Tragic Reversal," LOUISVILLE COURIER-]., Oct. 10, 
1991, at A13. . 
eo The Marva Collins Story (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 31, 1981). 
66 STAND AND DELIVER (Warner 1988). 
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Although there are some successful segregated schools, particularly at 
the elementary level, no district has produced equal education on a large 
scale in segregated African-American or Hispanic schools. There is an 
extremely powerful relationship between segregation by race and income 
and the educational achievement levels of schools. These relationships be-
come even more intense and have e~en fewer exceptions at the secondary 
school level. 67 
There is very little evidence that this pattern of achievement is related 
to the overall level of school spending. Numerous studies show that simply 
shifting dollars to low-income schools will not produce solutions. For ex-
ample, even when discounting for inflation, average spending by urban 
school districts increased substantially in the 1980s, without a correspond-
ing significant rise in achievement. There is, however, positive evidence 
for the benefits of some targeted school interventions in the early years. 
Unfortunately, there is insufficient evidence to date documenting the edu-
cational benefits of court-ordered remediation. 
The idea that money could overcome the history of inequality caused by 
segregation was a basic element of the Supreme Court's decision in Milli-
ken 11.68 After denying city-suburban desegregation, the Court approved 
an order by a district court for state funding of remedial programs 
designed to overcome the "harms of segregation." Those programs began 
in Detroit in the late 1970s and were abandoned when the court ended 
supervision in 1989. There was no evidence that these programs achieved 
equal educational achievement. In fact, after nearly two decades of these 
programs, the school district showed the same kind of inequalities that 
prompted the initial litigation. 
A generation after the Supreme Court's failure to desegregate metropol-
itan De~roit, the inequalities between city and suburban school districts 
remain striking. Fifty-four percent of the city's students are poor, but only 
81 See PHILUP BURCH, THE DROPOUT PROBLEM IN NEW JERSEY'S BIG URBAN SCHOOLS: 
EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY AND GOVERNMENT INACTION (Bureau of Government Research, 
Rutgers University, 1992); Gary Orfield & Lawrence Peskin, Metropolitan High Schools: Income, 
Race, and Inequality, in EDUCATION POLITICS FOR THE NEW CENTURY (Douglas E. Mitchell & 
Margaret E. Goertz eds., 1991); DOUG MACIVER & JOYCE EPSTEIN, How EQUAL ARE OPPORTU-
NITIES FOR LEARNING IN DISADVANTAGED AND ADVANTAGED MIDDLE GRADES SCHOOLS? (1990) 
(Report No.7, The johns Hopkins University, Center for Research on Effective Schooling for Disad-
vantaged Students) . 
.. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). 
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8% of suburban students are poor. The average family income in the sub-
urbs is $46,200, compared to $23,600 in the city. Furthermore, the aver-
age taxable wealth per student is four times higher in the suburban ring. 
The city graduation rate was only 62% of the suburban rate and per pupil 
spending averaged 12.5% higher in the suburbs.69 Unfortunately, the 
court-ordered compensatory programs are gone. The separate schools are 
still unequal but the court has given up. 
In local educational debate and in some court orders, the dismantling of 
desegregation plans is legitimized by the argument that separate schools 
can now be made equal. This, of course, was the promise of Milliken II. 
Since 1979, a number of cities have experimented with remedies to eradi-
cate the harms of segregation. Two of the largest experiments in federal 
courts have taken place in the St. Louis and Kansas City cases, both of 
which have produced orders directing the State of Missouri-identified as 
the "primary Constitution<l;l violator" in decisions that have been appealed 
to the Supreme Court on numerous occasions-to spend hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars to upgrade segregated schools. 
The St. Louis desegregation plan contains four elements that have been 
subjected to a limited evaluation by the district court. For students within 
the city, the goal of the 1980 plan was to enroll all white students and as 
many black students as possible in schools desegregated at the fifty-fifty 
level. Some of these schools were neighborhood schools with mandatory 
reassignment and others were magnet schools. A recruitment center was 
established to help inform families about their choices. The plan left a 
substantial number of all-black schools since there were three black stu-
dents for every white student. Students from these schools were allowed to 
transfer to magnets or to other schools. Later, when a city-suburban law-
suit was settled with a· voluntary transfer plan,' city black students also 
obtained the right to enroll in subur,ban schools. 
A January 1992 evaluation showed that, among black students, the city 
magnets attracted the highest achieving group, the suburban transfer the 
next highest, and the neighborhood schools the lowest achieving group. 
When the scores were adjusted statistically to control for initial levels of 
eo Valerie E. Lee et al., Parental Choice of Schools and Social Stratification in Education: The 
Case of Detroit (1992) (unpublished paper prepared for School Choice and Family Policy Seminar, 
Harvard Graduate School of Education, on file with author). 
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achievement, the levels of achievement growth were similar in the various 
types of schools. The only exception was at the high school level (tenth 
grade), where growth was present only in the suburban schools.70 
In Kansas City, a committee appointed by the district court has moni-
tored the impact of a vast $1.4 billion program to upgrade the city schools. 
In the case, the district court explicitly rejected an effort by the plaintiffs 
to obtain city-suburban desegregation. The court ruled that under Milli-
ken v. Bradley,71 the suburbs could not be compelled to participate. How-
ever, the court ordered renovation of the city's severely deteriorated 
schools, lowered the class size, and required compliance with state stan-
dards because of serious constitutional violations. The fundamental policy, 
however, was a massive experiment in upgrading education and increas-
ing integration through the most extensive magnet school plan in the na-
tion. The report of the court-appointed monitoring committee disclosed 
very limited academic gains. Under the order, the committee reported that 
the district "has financial resources available which greatly exceed re-
sources available to other K-12 educational programs in the Kansas City 
metropolitan area." However, test scores shbwed only "modest incremen-
tal improvements," primarily in the earliest grades.72 Over the seven-year 
period the gaps between local and state average test scores had not closed 
significantly.73 
A court-ordered review of the consent decree in San Francisco included 
an evaluation of different types of expensive efforts to upgrade low-income 
schools with large concentrations of black and Hispanic students. An eval-
uation of eight years experience under the San Francisco consent decree 
desegregation program showed that there had been no gain for black or 
Hispanic students who transferred to low-income schools that. were given 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in supplemental funds each year to up-
grade their programs. In fact, many black students transferred from bad 
schools to worse schools and actually achieved at lower levels than those 
.0 ROBERT W. LISSITZ, AssESSMENT OF STUDENT PERFORMANCE AND ATTITUDE: ST. LOUIS 
METRoPoUTAN AREA COURT-ORDERED DESEGREGATION EFFORT (1992) (Report to Voluntary In-
terdistrict Coordinating Council) • 
.. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
,J REPORT OF THE DESEGREGATION MONITORING COMMITTEE FOR THE PERIOD JULY 1, 
1991 - JUNE 30, 1992 (Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990» . 
• 3 ld. at 20. 
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remaining at home.74 Thus, even a great deal of money and control at the 
school site level clearly does not guarantee gains. 
The report to the court, agreed to by experts representing all the par-
ties, showed that there were no gains associated with giving schools large 
sums of money without totally reorganizing the schools. There were 
clearly measurable gains for schools in low-income communities where the 
principal and the entire faculty were replaced with a new staff, hired 
outside of normal union procedures and committed to creating a new type 
of education. Low-income minority students who transferred to schools 
with increased funding showed no academic gains. Those who transferred 
to the fully reconstituted schools showed significant gains. But those who 
transferred to high achieving schools that had received no money for spe-
cial programs under the decree had by far the highest gains.7 !> This study 
was the first court-ordered study to follow students who had actually at-
tended various types of schools for several years to assess effects. If these 
findings were to be sustained in other studies, it would suggest that ex-
tremely far-reaching changes would be needed to achieve in isolated 
schools the benefits that could be found in high achieving middle-class 
schools. 
The basic assumption of those endorsing the theory that a school dis-
trict has overcome its history of racial discrimination is that a school dis-
trict can be expected to treat minority students fairly without court super-
vision because there are no longer racial barriers. The hope for such 
efforts has been incorporated in the plans for schools after dismantling in 
some districts. In Los Angeles, the segregated minority schools were sup-
posed to be uplifted by the Racially Isolated Minority Schools ("RIMS") 
program which expended hundreds of millions of dollars. Almost a decade 
after the plan had been adopted, however, the district was sued in litiga-
tion showing the persistence of a pattern of extreme inequality between 
minority and white schools. That case ended in a settlement in which the 
district conceded that it had not produced the necessary opportunities for 
low-income minority schools. The additional funds requested from the 
state, however, to implement the settlement were not forthcoming . 
•• GARY ORFIELD ET AL., DESEGREGATION AND EDUCATIONAL CHANGE IN SAN FRANCISCO: 
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON CONSENT DECREE IMPLEMENTATION (1992) (Report to 
Federal District Court) . 
•• [d. 
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Six years after Norfolk's return to neighborhood schools for the elemen-
tary grades, about four thousand students were enrolled in eleven schools 
that were almost entirely black. These schools were promised and received 
extra resources. A monitoring committee operated for five years to assure 
special attention. Black members of the school board won better paid 
teachers and smaller class sizes for these schools as well as special parent 
education programs and computerized reading centers. The special pro-
grams attracted virtually no white transfer students. Test scores were low 
and the special programs did not close the gap. Joseph Lindsay, who 
headed the oversight panel until it was dissolved, said that the isolation 
and poverty were damaging, stating "[t]here is a pervasive attitude in 
many of the target schools . . . a sense of isolation and hopelessness . . . 
that can't help but have an effect on academic achievement."76 Dr. Lucy 
Wilson, black school board chair, said in 1991 that busing had helped 
black children see that they were "as good as . . . youngster[ s] of the other 
race" but that "neighborhood schools diminish that perception."77 
One of the fundamental problems with the promise of separate but 
equal schools is that it fails to address the most important ingredient of a 
good school-classmates prepared to learn and connected to real opportu-
nity in the society. Students' motivation is not within the power of the 
school district to provide in resegregated schools. Nor is it possible to 
guarantee long-term provision of special programs. The very words of the 
Austin school board's resolution resegregating its elementary schools re-
flected the problem. The board identified some special programs and 
promised "to provide these educational efforts for a period of five years to 
ensure that students in the sixteen schools named herein have the finest 
education available in the Austin Independent School District."78 Nothing 
was said about what would happen after the five years. 
F. Division at Home 
Busing has been attacked so intensely for a lengthy period of time that 
local leaders, their attorneys, and the local establishment often believe at 
the outset that the change is unlikely to produce real conflict because 
?e Andrew Wolfson, Norfollc's Busing Solution Off 'Target,' LoUISVILLE COURIER-j., Oct. 20, 
1991, at Al, A14. 
n Id. 
?8 Resolution of Board of Trustees, Austin Independent School District (Apr. 13, 1987). 
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neighborhood schools enjoy general support within the community. Often 
there have been very widely publicized criticisms of the desegregation plan 
and its persisting inequalities by some visible minority leaders in the com-
munity. Most residents see desegregation as "an experiment that failed." 
In fact, however, the risks of serious local political division are much 
greater and there has been severe conflict in some districts. Even within 
the white community, deep divisions have developed in some communities 
considering dismantling plans. 
One of the least known facts of the Reagan-Bush era is that both mi-
nority and white support for -busing increased significantly during twelve 
years of conservative critiques of the plans. In 1966, when busing was 
first discussed, the Harris- Survey found only 17% in favor, but the overall 
number was up to 41 % by 1988. A number of Harris Surveys showed a 
large and growing majority of both minority and white parents of bused 
children who believed that the system was working out well. The General 
Social Survey of the University of Chicago's National Opinion Research 
Center found that only 13.5% of whites supported busing in 1972, the 
year after the first Supreme Court decision on the subject, but the level of 
support increased to 32.1 % in 1991. Throughout the 1980s and early 
1990s, the large national surveys of first-year college students-many the 
products of busing plans-showed majorities favoring busing. The most 
recent national survey, published by the Boston Globe in 1992, showed 
that 80% of Americans preferred integrated schools and that 53% would 
support busing if it was "the only way to make sure children attend 
school with classmates of different racial and ethnic backgrounds."79 Bus-
ing is not a popular policy, but school integration has wide support and 
busing is gaining support over time, particularly among those who have 
experienced it. Local assumptions about attitudes may be wrong. 
The school superintendent of Jefferson County in metropolitan Louis-
ville, Kentucky, proposed to dismantle the elementary school desegrega-
tion policy in 1991, eleven years after the district was released from court 
supervision. Little controversy was expected since the change had been 
endorsed by the school board's only black member and some other com-
munity leaders. Following the announcement of the plan, however, a very 
intense controversy began. 
7. Larry Tye, U.S. Sounds Retreat in School Integration, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 5, 1992, at 15. 
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The plan was announced on September 23 and scheduled for action 
within a month. Shortly thereafter, community groups began to demand a 
delay in changing the plan. The system's teachers association was one of 
the first groups to call for a delay.80 The local human relations commis-
sion, the regional office of the National Conference of Christians and 
Jews, and the city's newspaper soon joined the teachers association. The 
Presbyterian Church's national Executive Director, Donald Stoner, wrote 
that "the elimination of busing will be perceived as a racially biased back-
ward step" which would harm'the area. He added, "I am certain that the 
Presbyterian Church would not have moved its national offices to Louis-
ville had the elimination of busing been on the school agenda at the 
time."81 
Black leaders were divided. Reverend Kevin Cosby, a black supporter 
of dismantling, said "[mJost parents are not concerned with integration, 
because we don't believe anymore ... that sitting next to a white kid is 
going to make my child any more academically astute. "82 Cosby claimed 
that black students had not solved their problems through integration and 
that< black parents were less able to follow their children's schooling be-
cause of the distance from the desegregated schools. Other leaders insisted, 
with the backing of several elected black officials, however, that separate 
was unequal. 
The Louisville Courier-J ournal conducted a survey of residents of the 
metropolitan area that showed that 36% of those expressing an opinion 
opposed ending the busing plan. Twenty-nine people thought that educa-
tion would be better in white schools after resegregation for every person 
who thought that it would be better in the black schools. Fifty-four per-
cent believed that the schools would be equally good.8s 
The attitudes of blacks in a community which had experienced massive 
and unequal busing for sixteen years were strongly opposed to a return to 
.0 Scott Wade, NAACP, Teachers Union Seek Delay of Busing Vote, LoUISVILLE COURIER-]., 
Oct. 9, 1991, at At. 
.1 Lawrence Muhammad & Sheldon Shafer, Presbyterian Executive's Letter Denounces Plan to 
End Busing, LOUISVILLE COURIER-]., Oct. 16, 1991, at'Bt. 
.. Jim Adams, Division of Blacks over Busing Is. Ironic, LOUISVILLE COURIER-]., Oct. 8, 1991, 
at Bt. 
.s Stan McDonald &. Scott Wade, Whites Divided Over Plan to End Forced Busing, LoUIS-
VILLE COURIER-]., Oct. 27, 1991, at At. 
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neighborhood schools. According to the poll, 69.9% of blacks opposed the 
proposal while 23.6% supported it. Further, 52.5% of blacks thought that 
the education would be better in the white schools after resegregation. 
Only 1.8% expected it to be better in the black schools. Those who 
thought education had improved for black students under the busing plan 
outnumbered those who thought it had deteriorated by a six to one ratio. 
One of the striking results of the survey was that the pressure for 
change was not coming from the parents of children who were bused. For 
black parents of bused children, 81% said that the experience had been 
satisfactory and only 7% said it was not satisfactory. Among white par-
ents, the division was 53% to 46%.84 
The attitudes in 1991 were in striking contrast to the early days of the 
plan, which had been implemented with great strife and very little local 
leadership. Whites interviewed at the end of the first year of desegregation 
reported only 6% in favor of the busing plan. The following year it was 
down to 5%. More than nine-tenths were opposed and only 2% were un-
certain. Among blacks, 61% were in favor the first year and 57% the sec-
ond year. Furthermore, 35% of 'blacks were opposed the first year and the 
number rose to 40% the second year.811 In Louisville, the experience of 
desegregation obviously changed the attitudes of the community, creating 
considerably more support for desegregation and suspicion of resegrega-
tion plans. 
The division in the community in 1991 produced angry meetings and 
eventually led to a modification of the plan. The resulting compromise 
included a decision for a magnet school plan for the elementary grades, 
and the school district guaranteed that mandatory reassignment would be 
resumed if needed to maintain integration. That plan succeeded in main-
taining elementary school integration when implemented in the fall of 
1992. 
The lesson of the Louisville conflict is that desegregation may have 
strong support, even when it is not apparent on the surface. In Louisville, 
a large majority of black parents disagreed strongly about the desirability 
.. Id. 
a. John B. McConahay & Willis D. Hawley, Reactions to Busing in Louisville: Summary of 
Adult Opinions in 1976 and 1977, at 9 (1979) (unpublished study, on file at the Center for Policy 
Analysis, Duke University). 
HeinOnline -- 42 Emory L. J. 788 1993
788 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42 
of returning to all-black schools and most believed that their children had 
gained under the desegregation plan. There was even a significant fraction 
of the white cOIl]Jllunity that favored maintaining the plan. The political 
costs and community divisions that emerged in the battle were, obviously, 
much more serious than the school district leaders had expected. In fact, 
the highly regarded local superintendent, Don Ingwerson, left his job later 
in the school year, reporte9.ly because of the conflict caused by his resegre-
gation proposal. 
Even if there is unity at the outset, local leaders would be foolhardy to 
believe that consensus will persist if the neighborhood schools become in-
creasingly unequal. For example, a few years after Norfolk's well-
regarded black superintendent promised to make the segregated schools 
successful, the system's black school board chairman criticized the ine-
quality of the segregated black neighborhood schools. 
III. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A POSITIVE END TO 
JUDICIAL MANDATES 
Desegregation is a difficult and often painful change in the long-
standing racial practices of school systems and communities. Many minor-
ity families fight for integrated schools so intensely because they believe 
their children have been given an inferior education and will not have 
equal opportunities as adults. It should not be surprising that proposals 
for returning to segregation often arouse intense conflicts in a society 
where there are no major examples of large school systems where separate 
schools are equal. Communities considering a return to segregated neigh-
borhood schools by fighting for unitary status should carefully weigh ac-
tual experiences of other cities and the real costs and risks in reaching 
decisions on strategies for unitary status cases. They should also consider 
the benefits and perceived costs of their existing desegregation plans and 
determine whether problems can be addressed through modifications 
rather than endings of decrees. If a plan has produced substantial and 
reasonably stable desegregation, their time might be better spent dealing 
with the "second generation" problems of creating equity, excellent educa-
tion, and positive relationships within genuinely integrated schools. Much 
of the dissatisfaction with orders stems directly from failure to seriously 
address these issues of in-school inequalities after the initial transition 
period. 
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Many district officials are not aware that obsolete decrees can be im-
proved by negotiations with the civil rights organizations that brought the 
cases in the first place. Consent decrees and plan modifications have been 
negotiated in a number of large urban systems. As representatives of the 
minority children, the plaintiffs have a strong interest in ending ineffective 
or counterproductive plan components and improving on the beneficial 
ones. At least some of the problems encountered by local school boards 
and administrators may be resolved in this manner, at very low costs and 
with no disruptions. 
In those communities determined to pursue the end of court supervi-
sion, some of the more successful local experiences of the 1980s suggest 
considering an alternative model to the end of a desegregation order. The 
first step is to recognize that the racial inequalities and conflicts will not 
go away whatever a court might do and that these conflicts threaten edu-
cational progress. The long-run goal of a plan recognizing this fact might 
be the development of more naturally integrated neighborhood schools 
without busing, utilizing a growing share of voluntary choices for desegre-
gation. Denver, Colorado, and Palm Beach County, Florida are among 
the communities that have developed plans in cooperation with housing 
institutions to increase neighborhood integration. Such plans reduce the 
long-term burdens on school systems without raising issues of racial divi-
sion or educational inequity. 
Voluntary plans that actually maintain integration may be far easier in 
communities with no segregated schools and a generation of experience 
with integration than in communities where the voluntary approach is 
implemented in a rigidly segregated setting with strong negative stereo-
types among whites about the minority schools. If eliminating mandatory 
desegregation is the goal of the effort to achieve unitary status, that goal 
may possibly be achieved in stages without facing either the costs and 
risks' of a unitary status proceeding or the other forms of legal battles 
which inevitably follow the recreation of segregated and unequal schools 
for minority students. . 
It was never the goal of civil rights litigators to bus students perma-
nently; busing was approved as an admittedly difficult means to a very 
important goaL Giving up mandatory transportation in favor of stable, 
integrated communities with integrated schools, or popular integrated 
magnet schools, may be a reasonable approach if the school district guar-
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antees that additional steps will be taken to integrate the schools should 
the choice process fail. If a magnet school approach is chosen, however, 
the school authorities must be committed to the necessl;iry expenditures for 
programs and transportation and to policies offsetting the tendency of 
magnet programs to produce stratification within a district. 
This Article raises serious questions about the assumptions made by 
courts and local policymakers pursuing dismantling of desegregation 
plans. There may be far fewer gains and far larger costs than have been 
previously recognized in pursuing the restoration of segregated neighbor-
hood schools. This does not mean that plans cannot be improved and the 
degree of judicial control cannot be greatly diminished over time. Jurists 
and educators may, however, be much more likely to find that path by 
keeping their eyes on the prize of Brown rather than by turning again 
down the blind alley of Plessy. 
